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Abstract 
 
Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) is a wireless-oriented form of communication 
largely used for outdoor applications, such as environmental monitoring and military 
surveillance. Therefore, a jamming attack is one of the denial of service attacks 
(DOS) that may take place by jamming the communication channel, making 
communication between genuine sensor nodes difficult or even impossible. Several 
studies have been carried out to develop countermeasures against jamming attacks, 
utilising parameters such as Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR), Packet Send Ratio (PSR), 
Received Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) and Clear Channel Assessment (CCA). 
The accuracy of the parameters used is very important for developing successful 
countermeasures against jamming attacks. Consequently, the focus in this study is to 
examine the effect of a jamming attack that was generated by one or more wireless 
sensor network nodes on PDR, PSR and RSSI, and look at the enhancements that 
can be made on Packet Delivery Ratio by altering the value of CCA on sender nodes. 
The experiment was performed using XBee RF and K-mote devices configured as 
jammers by disabling the CSMA protocol. It was performed in a non-isolated room in 
order to emulate a real-life environment.  
Two scenarios were carried out in this study. The first scenario aimed to study RSSI, 
PSR and PDR values with a fixed CCA value, and the second scenario studied the 
effect of CCA on PDR value. 
The experiment showed that the RSSI value measured by XBee RF inflated in the 
presence of noise. This fact has to be considered when RSSI is utilised in jamming 
attack counter measures. Further, it has been observed that the PDR value is 
distressed by jamming because genuine packets collide with jammers’ packets and 
increase the power of the sent packets without considering that the distance will not 
be enough to enhance the PDR value. This study demonstrates that changing the 
CCA threshold value on the XBee RF module influences the Packet Delivery Ratio 
(PDR) value in the presence of jamming. 
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1. Introduction: 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) is a type of ad-hoc networks that consist of limited 
energy, tiny and low cost sensor nodes. The main purpose of WSN is to provide an 
interface for the computer system to the real world by providing physical information 
such as temperature, light, radiation, etc. The functionality of WSN differs from any 
other wireless network in that all devices in WSN are totally independent, not 
controlled by human users, and these devices are limited in terms of battery life and 
processing power. Therefore, they can only offer simple and predefined tasks (Acs 
and Buttyan, 2008). 
As in all computing environments, it is essential to ensure the appropriate 
functionality of WSN to achieve correct service. WSN should comply with certain 
security requirements, such as confidentiality, integrity and authentication. However, 
to achieve the security requirement on WSN is not an easy task, due to the 
constraints in resources in sensor nodes. 
Since WSN is a wireless-oriented infrastructure, denial of service attacks (DOS) - for 
example, a jamming attack - may take place by jamming the communication channel 
and preventing the member of the network from sending or receiving packets. The 
attacks can take place against the internal routing protocol (Acs and Buttyan, 2008). 
Several studies have been carried out to develop countermeasures against jamming 
attacks. The accuracy of the parameters that are used in countermeasures is very 
important for developing a successful countermeasure against jamming attacks, 
therefore the focus in this study is to examine PDR, PSR, RSSI and the 
enhancement that can be made to Packet Delivery Ratio by altering the value of CCA 
on sender nodes. This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the literature 
review and background of WSN and jamming attacks. Section 3 describes the 
materials and methodology of the experiment. Section 4 analyses the experiment 
results. This paper concludes with Section 5. 
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2. Literature review 
2.1 Electronic Spectrum 
Jamming attack is a physical layer attack therefore it is very important to study the 
physical layer of wireless communication in order to protect  the WSN from jamming 
attack, the most common wireless technologies use electromagnetic wireless 
telecommunications. Electromagnetic spectrum is the broad range of frequencies. 
Radio is only one slice of the electromagnetic spectrum, as shown in figure (2.1). 
Radio waves can travel through solid materials such as clothing, furniture and brick 
walls because radio energy requires no medium. Radio waves affect conductors like 
metal and form different types of energy electrical signals, which means that radio 
waves cannot travel through metal walls but this also means that metal can be used 
in radio antennas on wireless modules (Faludi, 2011). 
 
 
Figure (‎2.1) Electromagnetic spectrum (Faludi, 2011) 
 
 
When radio signals radiate away from their source, they rapidly spread out like a 
wave in water. Radio decay occurs according to the inverse square law; therefore, it 
needs more power in order to move to longer distances (Faludi, 2011). As such, it is 
important to keep the inverse square law in mind when designing WSN networks 
(Faludi, 2011). 
I = P/4πr2         ( 2.1) 
I = Intensity at r 
π= Is pi 
r = radius of sphere 
P = power at source 
Surface area of sphere = 4πr2 
 
 
Wireless communication has become very popular in recent decades because of its 
flexibility, low-cost management and implementation, in comparison to wired 
communications. 
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The increase in the use of wireless communication has caused the radio spectrum to 
become very expensive. Therefore, many wireless standardised technologies 
operate in the industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) radio band, which is a group of 
radio bands internationally reserved for industrial, scientific and medical purposes 
(Baccour et al., 2013; Coleman and Westcott, 2012). Unlicensed ISM frequency 
available bands are as follows: 
 
Frequency range Bandwidth 
Centre 
frequency 
Availability 
6.765 MHz 6.795 MHz 30 kHz 6.780 MHz 
Subject to local 
acceptance 
13.553 MHz 13.567 MHz 14 kHz 13.560 MHz Worldwide 
26.957 MHz 27.283 MHz 326 kHz 27.120 MHz Worldwide 
40.660 MHz 40.700 MHz 40 kHz 40.680 MHz Worldwide 
433.050 MHz 434.790 MHz 1.74 MHz 433.920 MHz 
Subject to local 
acceptance 
902.000 MHz 928.000 MHz 26 MHz 915.000 MHz 
Subject to local 
acceptance 
2.400 GHz 2.500 GHz 100 MHz 2.450 GHz Worldwide 
5.725 GHz 5.875 GHz 150 MHz 5.800 GHz Worldwide 
24.000 GHz 24.250 GHz 250 MHz 24.125 GHz Worldwide 
61.000 GHz 61.500 GHz 500 MHz 61.250 GHz 
Subject to local 
acceptance 
122.000 GHz 123.000 GHz 1 GHz 122.500 GHz 
Subject to local 
acceptance 
244.000 GHz 246.000 GHz 2 GHz 245.000 GHz 
Subject to local 
acceptance 
Table (1) Unlicensed ISM frequency bands (Radio Regulation, 2012) 
 
The ISM bands rules specify as well that Spread Spectrum has to be used for 
modulation.  
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2.2 Spread Spectrum  
Spread spectrum (SS) is a technique of generating signals with bandwidths that are 
deliberately spread in the frequency domain. It is accomplished by combining a code 
sequence with the digital data before modulation. SS is used to mitigate against 
noise and jamming (Bullock, 2014). 
 
The basic idea is to mix the narrow band signal with a high frequency pseudo 
number signal (PN). The process could be reversed using the same code (PN) to 
recover the original signal (Parker, 2010). 
 
When SS is used, there will be losses due to non-ideal spreading and de-spreading 
techniques, which leads to reductions in the received signal power. The spread 
spectrum loss is approximately 1 to 2 dB and it varies from system to system.  
 
  LSS = spread spectrum loss (1 to 2 dB)    (‎2.2) 
 
The main reason for using the SS is to reject other signals and jammers; this ability is 
called process gain (Gp). The jamming margin (Jm) is the amount of extra power that 
the jammer transmits to jam the receiver (Bullock, 2014). 
   Jm = Gp- LSS      ( ‎2.3) 
 
Figure (‎2.2) Spread spectrum (Parker, 2010). 
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Figure (‎2.3) Signal power before and after spread spectrum (Prabakaran, 2003) 
 
DSSS is the most common method used in digital telecommunications in which the 
original signal is modulated by a higher frequency of pseudorandom noise (PN) data. 
Each bit is a chip. The high rate chip changes will increase the occupied frequency 
bandwidth of the signal and reduce the concentration of the signal energy around the 
carrier (Parker, 2010; Finne, 1996). 
 
Figure (‎2.4) Modulation of DSSS (Parker, 2010) 
 
 
In IEEE 802.15.4 every four bits of actual data are grouped together (symbol) and 
mapped to a unique 32-bit sequence called pseudorandom noise (PN), while the 
lookup table contains symbol-to-PN mapping, which includes 16 PN. Each PN 
consists of a random sequence of zeros and ones. In order to reduce the similarity of 
PN values in a lookup table a special procedure called a cross-correlation function is 
used. The DSSS will cause an increase in signal bandwidth; for example, if the 
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original bandwidth is 250 KHz, then after spreading the bandwidth of the signal 
travelling over air it will be 2 MHz, as shown in figure (2.6). 
The despreading on the receiver device will reduce the bandwidth back to its original 
value, and the spreading/despreading process will not cause increases in noise 
levels (Farahani, 2008; Muntwyler et al., 2012). The processing gain for 2.4 GHz RF 
band in IEEE 802.15.4 is equal to 9dB: 
 
Processing gain = 10 * log10 [2Mbps/250Kbps] ≈ 9dB    (‎2.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (‎2.5) Signal PSD before and after DSSS (Farahani, 2008) 
 
 
Where signal power spectral density (PSD) is the signal power versus frequency 
(Farahani, 2008), DSSS reduces the interference effect on sent signals because the 
spread RF signals occupy a larger bandwidth but they use a lower spectral power 
density (Gascon, 2013). 
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2.3 IEEE 802.15.4 
 
In the past few years, several short range wireless technologies such as IEEE 
802.15.4, have been developed for wireless sensor networks (WSN). These WSN 
related technologies primarily operate in the unlicensed ISM (industrial, scientific, and 
medical) band which is shared with other major wireless standards such as IEEE 
802.11, Bluetooth, and cordless phone .IEEE 802.15.4 is developed for low-cost, 
low-power networks. The IEEE 802.15.4 involves the bottom two ISO/OSI layers of 
medium access control (MAC) and the physical (PHY) layer. It is targeted for low-rate 
wireless personal area networks (LR-WPAN), as IEEE 802.15.4 is used for short 
distance communication and has a low cost. There are two options for higher layers, 
such as the ZigBee protocol stack, specified by the industrial consortia ZigBee 
Alliance, and IPv6 over a low-power PAN (6LowPAN). 
 
The IEEE 802.15.4 physical layer operates in three different unlicensed bands 
according to geographical area. The physical layer provides the ability for radio 
transceiver activation and deactivation, energy detection, link quality, clear channel 
assessment, channel selection and transmission and reception of packets (Baccour 
et al., 2013; Buratti et al., 2011). 
 
The RF for 2.4 GHz uses direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS); the raw bit rate 
for IEEE 802.15.4 is 2Mbps but because DSSS uses 32-chip for every four bits of 
data, it will reduce the actual data rate to 250 Kbps. The IEEE 802.15.4 MAC controls 
the flow of frames that are sent through the radio and transmitted over the air. It is 
designed to host different network topologies and higher-layer stacks. IEEE 802.15.4 
MAC offers security, definite timeslots, beaconing services and node associations for 
establishing a network. 
 
IEEE 802.15.4 uses standard CSMA/CA protocol with back-off capability. The 
CSMA/CA is a process for network access when devices are not negotiating 
timeslots for transmission, as network devices are listening to channels and waiting 
until the channel is available to start transmitting the data. When the channel is busy, 
the network device sets a back-off timer and waits for it to expire; when the back-off 
time expires, the network device will listen again and if the channel is still busy its 
increment sets the back-off timer to a larger value. The network device may enter 
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sleep mode to save power; during the back-off timer the sleep mode feature is 
available based on the type of IEEE802.15.4 device (Hunn, 2010; Chiuso et al., 
2009). 
2.4 Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) 
 
CCA is used by the medium access control (MAC) protocol to decide if the channel is 
clear enough to transmit WSN packets. CCA detects energy on the RF channel by 
using a simple energy detection method used by 802.15.4 sender and receiver 
nodes. The sender uses CCA to identify the availability of the RF channel before it 
starts sending packets and the receiver uses the same CCA mechanism to detect 
incoming packets (King, Brown and Roedig, 2014). 
The CCA works in three operation modes: 
1- Energy detection: the CCA reports a busy channel if the detected energy is above 
a specified threshold. 
2- Carrier sense mode: CCA reports a busy channel if it detects a signal with 
802.15.4 characteristics regardless of whether it is lower or higher than the specified 
threshold. 
3- Carrier sense with energy detection: this is a combination of both previous 
techniques. 
MAC utilises CCA in a CSMA/CA mechanism. The CSCA/CA mechanism depends 
on the network operation behaviour (beacon-enabled or non beacon-enabled) 
(Tennina et al., 2013). 
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Figure (2.6) CSMA/CA mechanism for beacon-enabled mode (Tennina et al., 2013) 
 
Figure 2.7 shows the CSMA/CA mechanism for the beacon-enabled mode. Three 
variables are used in the mechanism: 
NB: number of backoffs 
CW: contention window 
BE: back-off exponent 
1. Initially, NB and CW equal 0,BE set to a minimum value between 2 
and the macMinBE. 
2. MAC waits for the random back-off delay before attempting to access 
the channel. 
3. CCA verifies the channel availability. 
4. CCA returns a busy channel, NB increases by 1, and the process 
must start again. 
5. CCA returns the idle channel, CW decreases by 1 and when CW 
reaches 0, the message will be transmitted (Tennina et al., 2013). 
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Figure (2.7) CSMA/CA mechanism for non beacon-enabled mode (Tennina et al., 
2013). 
The CCA threshold value is configurable on the XBee RF module, and the CCA 
threshold range on XBee is -36 dBm to -80 dBm (XBee RF Modules, 2015; Lee, Kim 
and Shin, 2012). 
 
XBee calculates CCA on the basis of the channel measurement over 0.128ms (Digi, 
2015); the collision happens when XBee starts sending packets concurrently with 
other devices using a radio frequency channel. The CCA mechanism may not 
succeed in detecting activity on a channel if transmissions started less than 0.128ms 
before the CCA sampling (Kiryushin, Sadkov and Mainwaring, 2008). 
RSSI readings may include noise components, so in the presence of noise the figure 
will be inflated (Foster, 2011). 
2.5 Interference in 2.4 GHz ISM band 
 
Additional to WSN nodes there are many other wireless communication devices 
operating on 2.4GHz; for example, microwave ovens, cordless phones, medical 
diathermy machines, military radar and Wi-Fi. 802.11 devices make 2.4 GHz ISM the 
most congested ISM band (Baccour et al., 2013). 
 
Bluetooth uses a frequency hopping spread spectrum (FHSS), which hops between 
79 channels with 1Mz as the width of each channel. Bluetooth hops 1600 per second 
because there are only 79 channels available; each channel is used around 20 times 
each second. The interference produced by IEEE 802.15.1 devices is not 
problematic for WSN because the interference generated by Bluetooth spreads 
across the whole 2.4 GHz evenly. Bluetooth version 4 uses adaptive frequency 
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hopping (AFH) to protect against interference; this does not use the hopping 
sequence, however, because the low power of Bluetooth is not a real threat 
(Ericsson, 2010). 
 
IEEE 802.11 uses ISM 2.4 GHz bands (2400-2483.5 MHz), which divides the ISM 
band to 14 channels 22 MHz. IEEE 802.11 devices use very high power (24 dBm) as 
compared to WSN nodes and uses 22 MHz channels; for that reason it can interfere 
with many IEEE 802.15.4 channels at the same time. Many studies have been done 
on the coexistence of IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.15.4 and show that WSN suffers 
from high packet loss in the presence of IEEE 802.11. The packet loss rate of IEEE 
802.15.4 depends on IEEE 802.11 device activity and the distance from sensor 
nodes. 
 
A microwave oven is also a source of interference to WSN that operates on 2.4 GHz. 
The power of a microwave ovens signal varies; based on the model it could be up to 
60 dBm (Baccour et al., 2013; Andrews, 2012). 
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2.6 Launching and Detecting Jamming Attacks in Wireless 
Networks 
Wireless connectivity threats can be addressed by a suitable design that provides 
congeniality, authentication and integrity to the wireless network. Wireless, however, 
is vulnerable to other types of attacks that cannot be protected by cryptography 
methods. 
 
It is very important to identify the type of attack in order to take suitable action against 
threats. A jammer is a device that launches attacks against wireless networks and 
continuously emits RF signals to fill a wireless channel and block genuine traffic. 
Communications for jammers are not compliant with MAC protocols (Muraleedharan 
and Osadciw, 2006; Xu et al., 2005). The effectiveness of jammers can be measured 
based on the following metrics:  
 
Packet Send Ratio (PSR) is the ratio of packets sent out by the legitimate wireless 
device to the total number of packets that are intended to be sent to a MAC layer. 
The wireless device sends packets when the channel is idle; therefore, when there is 
noise on the channel caused by the attacker, this causes a delay in transmitting 
packets (Sun and Wang, 2010). 
 
PSR = packets sent/packets intended to be sent    ) 2.5( 
 
Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) is the ratio of packets successfully received by the 
destination (after passing the CRC check) to the number of packets sent by the 
sender (Sun and Wang, 2010). 
 
PDR = packets that pass the CRC check/packets received    ) 2.6( 
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2.7 Jammer Attack Models 
 
A variety of jamming attacks can be performed to interfere with the wireless 
communication channel. There are four types of jamming attacks: 
 
Constant Jammer 
A constant jammer device continuously emits a radio signal without following MAC 
layer rules, which prevents a legitimate device from being able to use the channel to 
transfer traffic. A Kmote-S1 Mote platform or a waveform generator can be used for 
testing (Zhang and Kitsos, 2009). 
 
Deceptive Jammer 
A deceptive jammer injects regular packets into a channel without gaps between 
packets so the legitimate sender will believe that the channel is busy. The jammer 
could send preamble bits continuously instead of entire packets (Zhang and Kitsos, 
2009). 
Figure (2.8) shows that constant jammer continually emits radio signal, and can be 
implemented using either a waveform generator that continuously sends a radio 
signal or a normal wireless device that continuously sends out random bits to the 
channel without following any MAC-layer etiquette, aims at keeping the channel busy 
to cause interference to genuine nodes that have already started data transfer and 
corrupt their packets. Deceptive jammer instead of sending out random bits, the 
deceptive jammer constantly injects regular packets in terms of packet format such 
as preamble ,payload and CRC without leaving any gab between packets to keep the 
channel busy. 
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Figure (‎2.8) Constant jammer and deceptive jammer (Mpiziopoulos, 2009) 
Random Jammer 
A random jammer changes continuously between sleeping and jamming modes. 
During the jamming mode it could act as a constant or a deceptive jammer. This type 
of jamming is used when the jammer needs to save power (Zhang and Kitsos, 2009). 
Reactive Jammer 
A reactive jammer starts transmitting a radio signal as soon as it detects activity on 
the channel. The jammer will not save power because it is continuously sensing the 
channel, but it is harder to detect (Zhang and Kitsos, 2009). 
 
Figure (‎2.9) Random jammer and reactive jammer (Mpiziopoulos, 2009) 
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Figure (2.9) shows that a Instead of continuously sending out a radio signal, a 
random jammer alternates between sleeping and jamming. after jamming for a while, 
it turns off its radio and enters a “sleeping” mode. It will resume jamming after 
sleeping for some time. During its jamming phase, it can behave like either a 
constant jammer or a deceptive jammer. Quiet when the channel is idle and transmits 
when it senses channel activity targets the reception of a message and harder to 
detect .During its jamming phase, it can behave like either a constant jammer or a 
deceptive jammer. 
Constant, deceptive, random and reactive jammers are very effective if they are 
placed at an appropriate distance from the receiver node. However, constant and 
deceptive jammers are inefficient because they will consume the power before the 
victims. Reactive jammers are more energy efficient because they go into sleep 
mode when the network is idle (Zhang and Kitsos, 2009). 
Signal strength is one of the mechanisms that detects jamming therefore Received 
Signal Strength Indication (RSSI) is utilized for this purpose. 
The received signal strength indicator (RSSI) is a feature provided by RF 
transceivers whose aim is to estimate received power in the selected frequency 
channel. The power of the signal is received in milliwatts and the unit for RSSI is 
decibel-milliwatts (dBm) (Sauter, 2011). It is used in many wireless applications and 
protocols, such as localisation, topology control, link scheduling and link quality 
estimation. Regardless of the technology, RSSI performance depends on the circuit 
used to realise the RF transceivers. 
RSSI is affected by several factors, such as: 
1. Transmitter variability: different transmitters behave differently even if they have 
been configured with the same configuration. 
2. Receiver variability: different receivers behave differently even if they have been 
configured with the same configuration. 
3. Antenna orientation: different antennas have their own radiation patterns. 
4. Multi-path fading and shadowing in the RF channel: channel behaviour greatly 
depends on environmental characteristics such as obstacles. 
CC2420 provides 8-bit RSSI value. There are two RSSI types sent by radio 
transmitters; the first measures the strength of the signal for the received packet and 
the second measures the power of the ambient channel noise (Chen and Terzis, 
2010). RSSI can be used to indicate the distance between WSN nodes; for example, 
if the value of received RSSI is -60 this means that the sender node is close to the 
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receiver, but if the RSSI of the received signal equals -100 dBm this means that the 
sender is far from the receiver (Sauter, 2011). 
 
The received signal strength can be calculated using the equation below: 
TRE = TSE. GT. GR [α/4πd]        ) ‎2.7( 
TRE: Power received by the receiver 
TSE: Transited power by the sender 
GT: Transmitted gain 
GR: Receiver gain 
α: Denoted wavelength 
RSSI is the ratio of the received signal strength to the reference power. 
 
RSSI = 10 log. TRE/Reƒp        ) ‎2.8( 
ReƒP: is the reference power equal to 1mW (Manju and Sasi, 2012). 
WSN Network devices will need to collect noise levels over a period of time and build 
a statistics model for the energy level of the network. The statistics values can be 
compiled either by average signal value or by the total signal energy over a window 
of N. Another way to detect jamming is by tracking the amount of time that the 
legitimate network device waits for the channel to become idle and then compare the 
waiting time with the sensing time during normal traffic. But a long carrier sensing 
time could be because of congestion (non-jammed scenario), and therefore it is 
important to use a mechanism to differentiate between normal and abnormal failure 
in order to access the network channel. 
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 Figure (‎2.10) Comparing RSSI values for different types of attacks. 
 
Figure (2.10) shows that it is easier to detect a constant and deceptive jamming 
attack by collecting the RSSI value of the channel as compared to other types of 
jamming attacks. 
 
According to Xu et al. (2005), the packet delivery rate (PDR) combined with signal 
strength is one the best means of detecting the jamming attack. When the signal 
strength is high and the PDR is low, this indicates a jamming attack, while when the 
signal strength is low and the PDR is low it means a poor link quality. Using PDR 
alone as a mean of detecting a jamming attack is not efficient because it could be low 
when WSN is congested with genuine traffic. 
 18 
 
 
 
2.8 Prior work 
There has been a dramatic increase in WSN applications that monitor physical and 
environmental conditions, for example temperature, sound and pressure; therefore, 
as in all computing environments it is essential to assure the appropriate functionality 
of WSN. In order to allow a correct service, WSN should comply with certain security 
requirements such as integrity and availability. A jamming attack is one of the main 
security threats that affects integrity and availability and has been intensively studied 
in resent years. 
(Boano et al. ,2011) studied interference on Wireless Sensor Networks using 
physical wireless sensor nodes and a CC2420 radio chip operating in 2.4GHz ISM 
band to generate repeatable patterns of interference. They thought that using real 
nodes rather than simulators would provide a more accurate result of hardware 
parameters such as RSSI and LQI. They didn’t use an 802.11 device to generate 
interference because WiFi is not suitable to generate tuneable static interference. 
Also, 802.15.4 devices can use channels that not overlap with 802.11 such as 
channels 25 and 26. Interference was created using software-defined radio (SDR) 
through the universal software radio peripheral (USRP). The T-mote sky nodes at a 
distance of one metre is used to test the level of interference by measuring the SNR. 
 
This experiment showed that SNR drops when there is interference at given instants 
of time. Homemade antenna made of can (Cantenna) is used to direct the 
interference and they found that the packet loss increases when the Cantenna points 
towards nodes. They also found that if interferer sending packets for 125ms per 
second this will cause 12.5% of packet loss but if interferer sends packets 875ms per 
seconds this will cause 87.5% pack loss. 
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Figure (2.11)  Homemade antenna made of can (Cantenna). 
 
(Manju and Sasi ,2012) state that a jamming attack can be detected by analysing 
metrics such as PRD, RSSI and Residual Energy (RE) and the node with high RE 
acts as a monitor node. Monitoring nodes are responsible for detecting the jammer in 
a WSN network by collecting RSSI and PDR. They found that jamming damages the 
data packets and consequently causes a reduction in PDR and this reduces the 
channel quality by interrupting the radio signal; therefore, PDR and RSSI are 
considered as metrics that can identify jammers. A weight is a combination of RSSI 
and PDR. If the weight value is above the threshold then the sender is marked as a 
jammer and will be isolated from the network. In this study network the simulator NS2 
used an IEEE 802.11 MAC layer for communication. 
 
(Morparia, Shah ,2007) found that the strongest packet can be received successfully 
when there is concurrent transmission by multiple WSN devices when SINR value is 
above a certain threshold. In their study TinyOS 2.X was used as an operating 
system and a CC2420 RF module. They disabled CSMA-CA in the CC2420 radio on 
two sender nodes (SRC1, SRC2); one of the sender nodes (SRC2) was transmitting 
with fixed power (-8dBm) while the power transmitted from the other node (SRC1) is 
variable. When the transmit power of SRC1 is between -24dBm and -19dBm the 
packets from SRC2 are received successfully but when the power of SRC1 between 
-3dBm and 2dBm the packets from SRC1 are received successfully. When the power 
transmitted from SRC1 is between -13dBm and -7dBm no packet is received from 
SRC1 or SRC2. 
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The experiment confirmed that RTS/CTS is not desirable in modern WSN, which 
supports power control and channel capture.  
 
In this study only two concurrent senders are used when a large number of senders 
transmit concurrently without RTS/CTS; this will cause packets loss especially when 
transmitters are at the same distance to a receiver.  
 
(According to Xu et al. ,2005), packet delivery rate (PDR) combined with signal 
strength is the best means of detecting a jamming attack. When the signal strength is 
high and PDR is low this indicates a jamming attack, while when the signal strength 
is low and PDR is low it means poor link quality. Using PDR alone as a means of 
detecting a jamming attack is not efficient because it could be low when WSN is 
congested with genuine traffic.  
 
In this study it has been found that the interference level is governed by many 
factors, such as the jammer distance from the wireless node, the transmission power 
of the jammer and the MAC protocol used on nodes. 
 
(Xu et al. ,2005) implemented jamming models (constant, deceptive, random and 
reactive) using Berkeley motes that employed Chipcon CC1000 RF transfer with 
TinyOS as the operating system with channel sensing and back of operations 
disabled by passing the Mac protocol. The Mac protocol for TinyOS release 1.1.1 
uses a fixed threshold value but the BMAC protocol change threshold value is based 
on the signal strength by choosing the minimum strength of the most recent readings. 
The packed send rate and the DSR packed delivery rate (PDS) result were different 
for nodes using BMAC and nodes using MAC1.1.1 when the same jammers were 
located over the same distance from the sender and the receiver.  
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Table (2) PDR and PSR values for nodes running BMAC and nodes running 
MAC1.1.1 
 
(Boano et al. ,2011) used motes based on Contiki with CC2420 RF modules in the 
test beds to generate noise. The RSSI experiment showed that the RSSI noise 
reading measured in the absence of packed transmission suffers from problems in 
three scenarios: 
 
1. When transmitting a non-modulated carrier.  
2. When a microwave is on. 
3. When Bluetooth transmits on the same channel. 
RSSI noise measurements were done using an Anritsu MS2711D spectrum analyser. 
Wrong RSSI readings cause wrong clear channel assessment (CCA). (Boano et al , 
2011) experiment showed that activating the peak detectors avoids the wrong RSSI 
reading during jamming caused by microwave ovens and increases the packet 
reception rate (PRR) by VP to 12%. 
 
(Bertocco, Gamba and Sona’s ,2008) study showed how changing the CCA mode 
affects the performance of the IEEE802.15.4 network when there is interference. S8 
 22 
 
used a CSMA non-beacon mode in the experiment, as there are two modes that 
CCA can use to decide if the channel is busy. The first CCA mode assumes the 
channel is busy if it detects that the RSSI is higher. The second CCA mode decides 
that the channel is busy if any signal is detected in spreading the characteristics of 
IEEE802.15.4.  
 
Two T-mote sky wireless sensors are connected to a PC used in a non-anechoic 
room and Agilent E4407B spectrum analyser is used to measure interference level. A 
high layer protocol is installed on motes to periodical poll information from sensors. 
The application works in a master and slave mechanism of 1 metre distance between 
master and slave. The packet error rate (PER) was 55% when CCA modes 1 and 2 
were in the presence of ZigBee interference. The performance was improved by 
disabling CCA since PER = 16.5%. 
 
(Siddhabathula et al. ,2012) developed a program to detect jamming attacks using 
observation from multiple nodes in order to speed up the detection. In their study 
they didn’t consider a compromised node scenario. The experiment assumes that 
attacker disables the carrier sense in enough time to achieve the attack of a constant 
jammer used in this study. Each node broadcasts beacons to jamming attacks and 
holds two arrays - current and history. If the node doesn’t receive a beacon it stores 
the value as zero and one means that the beacon has been received.  
 
If value in history is one and in current is equal to zero for a period of time then an 
alert will be will be sent to the base station. The base station detects jamming in the 
network after receiving 10 alerts. 40 Kmote-S1 with TinyOS software was arranged in 
a grid topology. Jammers were positioned outside the perimeter. It has been found 
that increased internal time will increase the time to detect jamming. This detection 
method consumes a lot of power on all nodes in WSN therefore it is not very 
practical. From the above studies it has been concluded that PDR, RSSI and PER 
are most practical metrics to detect jamming attacks and that increasing the packet 
power level will increase the probability of the successful delivery of packets. 
 
(Ramachandran and Roy, 2006) described the methods for Clear Channel 
Assessment in the 802.11 and 802.15.4 wireless networks. They examined the 
impact of sensing limitation and the power consumption of the various CCA methods 
on MAC performance and concluded that simulators that are used for performance 
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evaluations, like ns-2 and OPNET, did not contain detailed models for PHY layer 
modules like CCA and need to be upgraded. 
 
(Radio Regulation, 2012) studied Real-World Performance of Clear Channel 
Assessment in 802.15.4 Wireless Sensor Networks. In their experiment they used 
TmoteSkey motes with a CC2420 RF transceiver operating at 2.4 GHz band. The 
experiment involved two senders with the same distance to one receiver; the 
experiments were carried out in a closed room with no movement. All nodes 
operated on channel 26. They found that smaller CCA threshold results in a 
significant decrease in packet loss. The distance between sender and receiver and 
the power of senders were not stated in this study.  
In this experiment we studied the effect of CCA value and the power level of genuine 
packets sent by a WSN node in presence of constant jammers and the effect of 
jamming generated by WSN nodes on PDR, PSR and RSSI because these are the 
most used parameters in jamming countermeasures. 
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The following WSN transceivers have been used in this experiment: 
 
XBee RF Module: 
XBee is a module designed by Digi International to meet IEEE 802.15.4 standards for 
low cost and low power WSN. XBee operates in an ISM 2.4 GHz radio band. The RF 
data packet structure follows the 802.15.4 specification (XBee RF Modules, 2015) 
 
 
Figure (‎2.12) XBee RF Module (XBee RF Modules, 2015) 
 
The XBee RF module connects to an external host device through an asynchronous 
serial port, which can communicate with a Universal Asynchronous 
Receiver/Transmitter (UART) compatible interface, as shown in Figure ( 2.3) 
 
 
Figure (‎2.13) Serial communication of XBee (XBee RF Modules, 2015). 
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Data is received from a host though a DI pin (pin3) as an asynchronous serial. Each 
byte received starts with a start bit (low) followed by the least significant bits and 
ends with high the stop bit (high). The microcontroller and the RF module must be 
configured with similar settings such as baud rate, parity, data bits, start bits and stop 
bits. 
 
Figure (‎2.14)  (XBee RF Modules, 2015) 
 
By default the XBee module operates in transparent mode, as when the XBee 
module operates in this mode all data received from the DI pin is queued up for RF 
transmission and when RF data is received the data is sent out via DO pin. Data is 
buffered until one of the following incidents happens, then it will be packetised and 
transmitted: 
 
1. No more data is received from the UART for an amount of time equal or more 
than the timeout period. 
2. The number of characters received is equal to the maximum that can fit into 
the RF packet (100) 
3. The command mode sequence (GT+CC+GT) is received 
 
If the DI buffer becomes full, hardware or software flow control must be implemented 
in order to prevent overflow (XBee RF Modules, 2015). 
 
In API Operation mode, a host application can interact with the networking capability 
of the module. XBee can send events within module or defined operations. Transmit  
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Data Frames (received from the DI pin (pin 3)) include:  
• RF Transmit Data Frame  
• Command Frame (equivalent to AT commands) 
  
Receive Data Frames (sent out the DO pin (pin 2)) include:  
• RF-received data frame  
• Command response  
• Event notifications such as reset, associate, disassociate. 
 
In API mode a host application can send data frames that contain addresses and 
payloads. Data frames sent to the host contain status packets, source, RSSI and the 
payload information from received data packets (XBee RF Modules, 2015). 
When API mode is enabled the frame format will be as in figure (2.15), cmdID 
identifies that the API messages will be in the cmdData frame. 
 
 
Figure (‎2.15) API frame format  (XBee RF Modules, 2015) 
TX (Transmit) Request 
The cmdID value of 0x01 will trigger the RF module to transmit the packet.  
  
Figure (‎2.16) XBee frame cmdID value equal 0x01(XBee RF Modules, 2015) 
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TX (Transmit) Status: 
When the TX request finishes the module sends the API message with cmdID equal 
to 0x89. It will indicate whether the packet transition was successful or failed 
 
Figure (‎2.17) XBee frame cmdID value equal 0x89(XBee RF Modules, 2015) 
 
RX Receive Packet 
RF module passes on the UART message with cmdID equal to 0x81.  
 
Figure (‎2.18) XBee frame cmdID value equal 0x81 (XBee RF Modules, 2015) 
 
Kmote-S1 
Kmote-S1 is a wireless sensor node that comes with a humid/temp/light sensor 
board. It is supplied with an IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver working on 2.4 
to 2.4835 GHz, a globally compatible ISM band. Kmote-S1 is capable of transmitting 
at a 250 kbps data rate and it runs TinyOS 2.1.x (Madabhushi, 2007) 
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Figure (‎2.192) Kmote-S1 Mote (Madabhushi, 2007) 
 
The hardware design of Kmote-S1 is identical to Telosb, the microcontroller 
(MSP430) and radio (CC2420) used in Kmote-S1. 
CC2420 is an IEEE 802.15.4 compliant RF transceiver designed for low-power and 
low-cost WSN implementations. CC2420 contains a digital direct sequence spread 
spectrum (DSSS) modem, which provides a gain of 9dB and a data rate of 250 kbps. 
It works in 2.4 GHz ISM RF band and supports packet handling, data transmission, 
encryption and authentication, clear channel assessment (CCA) and link quality 
indication. Its features help to reduce the load on the host controller and transmit and 
receive data using a FIFO concept. CC2420 is used in many wireless sensor nodes 
such as MICAZ, Telosb and Kmote-S1 (Texas Instrument, 2014). 
 
Kmote-S1 run open source operating system designed for low-power wireless 
devices called TinyOS, it is used in sensor networks, ubiquitous computing, personal 
area networks, smart buildings and smart meters. It is a tiny framework designed for 
systems that require very aggressive resource management due to the highly 
constrained nature of their resources, such as power and memory.  
TinyOS is software that controls communication, routing, sensing and storage 
subsystems on sensor nodes and consists of the following: 
Modules: which provide the implementation of one or more interfaces. 
Configurations: which are used to assemble other components together (Suhonen 
et al., 2012; Levis, 2006). 
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3. Materials And Methodology 
 
Running a test on a WSN is a challenging task because only a real sensor network 
testbed can provide the realistic testing to understand resource limitations, 
communication loss and energy constraints. 
 
Designing and implementing a testbed is the main part of this research that allows us 
to conduct experiments with this model for the purpose of understanding the 
behaviour of the system and evaluating the effect of jamming on WSN. 
 
The initial plan was to use Kmote-S1 motes with TinyOS 2.1 as the sender, receiver 
and jammers nodes. The below steps have been achieved for this purpose: 
 
1. VMWARE workstation 10 was installed to host the Linux-based virtual 
machine. 
2. The Ubuntu 14.04 LTS operating system was installed on a virtual machine 
to provide the environment to program the Kmote-S1 and Kmote-B sensor 
notes. 
3. NesC is an extension to the C programming language and is designed to 
represent the structuring concepts and execution model of TinyOS 2.1. 
Therefore the Eclipse integrated development environment (IDE) and the 
Eclipse Plug-in (Yeti 2) was used for syntax highlighting, real-time code 
validation, code completion and providing various search tools. 
4. TinyOS 2.1 was installed on Ubuntu virtual machine to upload the settings 
on Kmote-S1 and Kmote-B. 
 
After starting the work of building the testbed using Kmote-S1 and Kmote-B several 
challenges were raised due to the complexity of building TinyOS applications and the 
relative high cost of TinyOS based nodes; therefore, a new testbed setup using XBee 
was used because it is lower in price and is easier to configure RF module 
parameters since all parameters can be configured using Graphical User Interface 
(GUI). 
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The Kmote-S1 nodes were used as jammers because disabling CSMA/CA is not 
possible on XBee firmware (10ed). 
 
The new wireless sensor network testbed was built using two XBee series 1 802.15.4 
OEM RF modules. Both XBee modules were connected to a computer by USB 
cables. XCTU is a multi-platform application installed on a managing computer XCTU 
used to configure and collect data from XBee RF modules. Two Kmote-S1 modules 
running TinyOS 2.1 were used as constant jammers, while CSMA-CA was disabled 
on jammers and configured to send packets with power level 0 dBm. 
 
The focus in this study is on the effect of a jamming attack that was generated by one 
or more wireless sensor network nodes on PDR (Packet Delivery Ratio), PSR 
(Packet Send Ratio) and RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indication) parameters. 
The reason of choosing PDR, PSR and RSSI parameters in the study is because 
they are used in the majority of jamming attack countermeasures. This study 
assumes that jammers will have similar capability in terms of power and frequency 
band. The second part of the experiment aims to study the effect of changing the 
value of CCA on the PDR value in the presence of a jamming attack. 
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3.1 Experimental Setup 
In this experiment two scenarios were carried out; the first scenario aimed to study 
RSSI, PSR and PDR values with a fixed CCA value and the second scenario studied 
the effect of CCA on PDR value. In both scenarios the sender and the receiver were 
placed at a separation of two metres. The experiment was performed in a non-
isolated room in order to emulate a real life environment. IEEE 802.11 used a 2.4 
GHz ISM radio spectrum except for channels 15, 20, 25 and 26, as in figure (4.2). 
Therefore, the WSN sender and receiver were configured to use channel 20 to avoid 
any conflict with IEEE 802.11, as shown in figure (4.2).  
    
 
 
 
 
Figure (‎3.1) Experiment setup. 
Distance 2 meter 
ISM RF Band 2.4 GHz 
Channel 20 
Receiver XBee 
4.50.208 
Connected to USB adaptor 
 
PC running X-CTU 
 
Sender XBee 
4.50.208 
Connected to USB adaptor 
 
USB cable USB cable 
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Figure (‎3.2) 2.4 GHz ISM radio spectrum 
  
100 packet sizes of 10 bytes were sent from the sender to the receiver and a delay of 
100ms occurred between packets at each scenario. Packets were collected on a PC 
using XCTU. Power level on Xbee series 1 with 10ef firmware can be configured with 
value of (0 dBm,-2 dBm,-4 V,-6 dBm ,-10 dBm), as shown in table (3) 
 
Table (3) Power level of XBee 
The clear channel assessment (CCA) threshold value range for Xbee series 1 is 
0x24 (-36 dBm) to ox50 (-80 dBm). The highest and lowest values of CCA and power 
level have been selected in scenarios to illustrate the best and worst performance 
under the jamming attack. 
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3.2 Scenario (1) the effect of jamming on RSSI, PSR and 
PDR 
3.2.1 Scenario 1.1 
100 Packets with a power level of -10 dBm were sent from sender node, while the 
Value of Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) was set to -80 dBm. No jammers were 
present in this scenario. The spectrum analyser (AirView) was placed at 1 metre 
distance from the sender, and the number of packets sent by the sender increased to 
1,000 in order to get clear readings from the spectrum analyser. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure (‎3.3) Readings from spectrum analyser show activities on channel 20 in 
absence of jamming power level -10dBm. 
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3.2.2 Scenario 1.2 
100 Packets with power level of 0 dBm sent from sender node, Value of Clear 
Channel Assessment (CCA) on set to -80 dBm. No jammers present in this scenario. 
spectrum analyzer placed 1 meter distance from sender, In order to get clear reading 
on spectrum analyzer 1000 packets.  
 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure (‎3.4) Readings from the spectrum analyser shows activities on channel 20 in 
the absence of the jamming power level 0dBm. 
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3.2.3 Scenario 1.3 
100 Packets with power level of -10 dBm sent from sender node, Value of Clear 
Channel Assessment (CCA) on set to -80 dBm. Two jammers configured to use 
channel 20 the jammers were sending packets with power level 0 dBm, Jammers 
placed 1 meter from sender. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure (‎3.5) Experiment setup jammers were added to the setup 
Distance 2 meter 
ISM RF Band 2.4 GHz 
Channel 20 
Receiver XBee 
4.50.208 
Connected to USB adaptor 
 
PC running X-CTU 
 
Sender XBee 
4.50.208 
Connected to USB adaptor 
 
USB cable USB cable 
Kmote-S1 as 
 Jammers 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure (‎3.6) Readings from the spectrum analyser shows activities on channel 20 in 
the presence of jamming sending frames with a power level of 0 dBm. 
 
 
3.2.4 Scenario 1.4 
100 packets with a power level of 0 dBm were sent from the sender node, while the 
Value of Clear Channel Assessment (CCA) was set to -80 dBm. Two jammers were 
configured to use channel 20 and were sending packets with a power level of 0 dBm. 
Jammers were placed 1 metre from the sender. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure (‎3.7) Readings from spectrum analyser shows the activities on channel 20 in 
the presence of jamming sending frames with a power level of 0 dBm 
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3.3 Scenario (2) the Effect of changing CCA values on PDR 
in presence of jamming 
In this scenario five different settings were implemented. In all scenarios 100 packets 
with power levels of -10 dBm were sent from the sender node but the Value of CCA 
changed on each scenario (-36, -51, -56, -67, -80) dBm. Two jammers were 
configured to use channel 20 and were sending packets with a power level of 0 dBm. 
Jammers were placed 1 metre from the sender. 
3.4 Results analysis 
3.4.1 Analyzing scenario (1) 
3.4.1.1 Analysing RSSI 
It has been observed that when sending low power packets (-10 dBm) in the absence 
of jamming the RSSI value for received packets was -66 dBm but when low power (-
10 dBm) packets were sent with the existence of jammers the RSSI value for the 
received packets was -64 dBm. Similarly, the RSSI value for received high power (0 
dBm) packets in the presence of jamming were higher than the RSSI on high power 
(0 dBm) packets received in the absence of jamming. It demonstrates that RSSI 
value in presence of noise will be inflated; the findings are compliant with the 
suggestion by gworle in the XBee-PRO XSC forum (Foster, 2011).   
 
 
 
Figure (‎3.8) RSSI comparison jamming VS non-jamming   
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Where RSSI-LP: Is the RSSI reading on receiver node when packets are sent with 
low power. RSSI-HP: Is the RSSI reading on receiver node when packets are sent 
with high power. RSSI-Jamming-HP: Is the RSSI reading on receiver node when 
packets are sent with high power in presence of jamming. RSSI-Jamming-LP: Is the 
RSSI reading on receiver node when packets are sent with low power in the 
presence of jamming. 
 
3.4.1.2 Analysing PSR and PDR results: 
The Packet Send Ratio (PSR) was calculated, which is the number of packets that 
have been successfully sent out compared to number of packets that were intended 
to be sent by MAC. The PSR value equals 1 for all scenarios including in the 
presence of jamming. The hypothesis is that the sender was able to find a time slot to 
send frames. The reason is firstly because in the testbed Kmote-S1 nodes used as a 
constant jammer hence they have limited resources such as power level. Secondly, 
XBee uses Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS) to modulate the frames 
before sending them to the physical layer; therefore, multiple users can randomly 
access communications and the RF channel with selective addressing (DeBruhl and 
Tague, 2011) (Pickholtz, Schilling and Milstein, 1982). 
 
With a predetermined distance between sender and receiver and an absence of 
jamming (scenario 1.1,1.2) the Packet Delivery Ratio (PDR) value equals 1, but in 
the presence of jamming the PDR was 0.9 when the CCA value was -80 dBm. The 
PDR value is distressed by jamming because genuine packets had a collision with 
jammers packets. 
 
The experiment demonstrates that in the presence of constant jamming, when 
increasing the power of the sent packets without considering the distance, this will 
not enhance the PDR value because the genuine sender and the jammers sending 
packets had the same power of 0 dBm but the jammers were closer to the receiver 
node.  
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3.4.2 Analysing the effect of changing CCA values on PDR 
The XBee sender backs off when noise on the RF channel is higher than the CCA 
threshold (XBee RF Modules, 2015). The result of scenario (2) demonstrates that 
changing the CCA threshold value on the XBee RF module influenced the Packet 
Delivery Rate (PDR) value. Figure (28) shows that PDR is 0.8 when the CCA value 
equals -36 dBm and PDR increases when CCA decrease to reach 0.95 when the 
CCA value equals -80, so the  findings of this experiment comply with the findings in 
the study carried by (Kiryushin, Sadkov and Mainwaring, 2008). 
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Figure (‎3.9) The PDR value changes with the changing of CCA. 
 
Because both genuine sender and jammers configured with a similar power level of 0 
dBm the jammers are closer to the receiver node as in figure (4.10). Therefore, the 
jammer packets will be stronger than genuine packets from the receiver’s point of 
view so when a collision occurs the genuine packets will always be lost. 
 
When the CCA threshold value is high in this situation the sender will send packets 
while the energy (noise) on channel is relatively high, i.e. there are packets 
generated by jammers in the channel; therefore, the probability of collision becomes 
high, which will decrease the PDR value. 
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When the CCA threshold value is low in this situation the sender will send packets 
while the energy (noise) on the channel is relatively low; therefore, the probability of 
collision becomes low, which will increase the PDR value. 
 
Finally, it has been observed that there is another reason why the presence of 
jamming the CCA mechanism on the sender node may not succeed in detecting the 
activity on a channel if transmissions started less than 0.128ms before CCA sampling 
as the sender will send the packet simultaneously with jammers packets (Kiryushin, 
Sadkov and Mainwaring, 2008). Therefore, in the presence of jamming there will 
always be a packet loss and the PDR for XBee will always be less than 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure (‎3.10)  Shows jammers are closer to the receiver node 
 
 
Jammers 
Power =0 dBm 
 
Distance 2 meter 
Distance 1 meter 
Sender Node 
Power =0 dBm 
Receiver Node 
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4. Conclusion and future work 
 
The aim of this research is to study the effect of a jamming attack on parameters that 
are used by the majority of jamming attack countermeasures, such as PDR (Packet 
Delivery Ratio), PSR (Packet Send Ratio) and RSSI (Received Signal Strength 
Indication) parameters. Following the study of previous parameters, the effect of 
changing the value of CCA on the PDR value was studied in the presence of a 
jamming attack. The experiment was performed in a non-isolated room in order to 
emulate a real life scenario. WSN nodes were communicating using channel 20 to 
avoid conflicting with IEEE 802.11 signals.  
The wireless sensor network testbed was built using two XBee series 1 802.15.4 
OEM RF modules. Two Kmote-S1 modules running TinyOS 2.1 were used as 
constant jammers. This study presumes that jammers will have similar capability in 
terms of power and frequency band. CSMA-CA was disabled on jammers and 
configured to send packets with power level 0 dBm. 
The study findings are: 
1. The finding of the second scenario should be considered in manufacturing 
802.15.4 RF transceivers to be equipped with the capability of configuring 
CCA value to lower than -80 dBm in order to enhance the PDR value in the 
presence of jamming or interference that is generated by compromised WSN 
nodes.  
2. The RSSI measured value by XBee is affected by the jamming activity. This 
fact needs to be considered when utilizing this parameter in jamming attack 
countermeasures and other implementations such as using XBee in real-time 
position detection and motion tracking by using RSSI. 
3. Overcoming the consequence of collisions that occur between genuine 
packets and jamming packets is by increasing the power of the genuine 
signal or by changing the location of the sender node to be closer to the 
receiver node. 
4. When WSN nodes are compromised and used as constant or deceptive 
jammers they will not be very efficient because they will be consuming the 
power before the victims. 
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Areas for future work will include developing a technique to detect and isolate the 
source of jamming in wireless sensor networks utilizing the parameters (RSSI, PDR, 
PSR, CCA) that have been studied in this research while considering the findings in 
this study.  
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